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ABSTRACT

THOR:
THE HYBRID ONLINE REPOSITORY

Timothy W. van der Horst
Department of Computer Science
Master of Science

Digital credentials enable users to perform secure interactions by proving either their
identity or that they posses certain attributes. Special care is taken to protect these
credentials and their associated private keys during transaction time. However, protection of these items outside of the transaction is often delegated to a secure credential repository. A mobile environment creates significant challenges for secure repositories. We examine these challenges with respect to existing repository practices and
produce a set of requirements that a repository must meet in order to cope with the
harshness of a mobile environment. We also present the design and implementation of
Thor (The hybrid online repository), a system that fulfills these requirements. Thor
leverages preexisting local and remote repositories and enhances their usability and
security through centralized management, credential context subsets, and credential
identifier obfuscation.
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Chapter 1 — Introduction

Protocols that make use of digital credentials employ safeguards that protect the
credentials during the life of the transaction. For the most part these protocols do
not, however, concern themselves with the protection of these credentials outside the
context of the transaction. This responsibility is delegated to a secure credential
repository. Many different types of repositories have been created to protect this
sensitive information. A mobile environment, however, invalidates many of the fundamental assumptions for storing, accessing and protecting sensitive information in
these repositories and introduces several new potential insecurities.
This research proposes a set of requirements for secure credential repositories in a
mobile environment and presents the design and implementation of a repository that
satisfies all of these requirements.
1.1

Motivating Scenario
Sid is a member of senior management. As part of his duties, Sid is required to

make frequent business trips. Sid uses a variety of wireless protocols (e.g., 802.11,
Bluetooth, and IrDA) in a variety of places to connect to the Internet and perform
transactions. Digital credentials help Sid authenticate as a valid subscriber to payper-use networks and as an employee to the internal corporate network.
Sid, however, is not always connected to a communications infrastructure. Despite
this lack of connectivity, e.g., during a flight, Sid continues to work diligently. He
uses digital signatures to authorize work orders, purchase approvals, and to sign his
business related email. These documents are transmitted when Sid reconnects to a
network.
Sid also has some free time on his trips so he likes to use digital credentials of a
1
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personal nature while on trips. He uses his credit card credential to purchase tickets
to historic landmarks and events. Sid also uses other digital credentials for these
non-business related electronic transactions.
Digital credentials are an essential part of Sid’s life while on the road as well as
when he is at home. As the number of credentials Sid possesses increases, so does
the need for organization. Although effective organization provides convenience when
selecting the credential to use for a specific purpose, keeping them safe is far more
important. If Sid’s credentials are ever stolen, a malicious person could impersonate
Sid in the electronic realm.
This research answers the following two questions raised by this scenario:
1. Where can Sid store his credentials so that they are accessible while he is mobile?
2. How are they kept safe?
1.2

Physical Credentials
Before these questions can be answered, the term credential must be more fully

defined. Physical credentials have been around for a long time. Indeed, they have
become commonplace in our society. These credentials are very useful and enable
many day-to-day transactions. A driver’s license serves as both an assertion that one
has been certified to drive and of one’s identity. Credit cards assert that a person is
trusted to pay for purchased goods and services within a specified period of time. An
employee ID asserts that one is a member of a company. Credentials can also contain
sensitive information like a credit card number, social security number, or age. In
some cases even one’s identity could be considered sensitive.
Credentials have two major components. The first element is the actual physical
credential which asserts attributes about the possessor. The second is a verifier or
authenticator through which the possessor may prove that this credential really be2
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longs to him. In the context of a driver’s license, a face that matches the one on the
driver’s license would be such a verifier. In the case of a credit card, a signature that
matches the one on the back of the card would be another such verifier.
There are several problems that exist with the physical credentials that are in
use today. Two of the biggest problems are that they can be forged and that their
verification process is easily compromised. The problem with these verifiers is that
they are available to anyone possessing the credential. A signature for a credit card
can be copied from the back of the card, and plastic surgery, make-up, or mere
coincidence could produce a matching face for a driver’s license. These verifiers are
the cause of many of the insecurities of physical credentials in the physical world, and
pose an even greater problem in the digital world.
In the digital world, e-commerce and other such online transactions are becoming
very popular. The need for credentials to assert attributes about both parties in a
transaction is very important. Physical credentials do not perform very well in this
environment as their imperfections are magnified when they are introduced to the
electronic realm.
1.3

Digital Credentials
Digital credentials, the electronic version of their physical counterparts, play a

pivotal role in the electronic realm. They are a useful component for establishing
secure communication links, such as TLS [12], and allow users to prove their identity through online authentication mechanisms. In addition to establishing identity,
digital credentials can also assert attributes possessed by its owner. These types of
credentials are particularly valuable in protocols that establish trust between strangers
in open systems, such as trust negotiation [22, 11, 23]. In plain and simple terms,
these credentials enable users to perform secure interactions with their PKI peers.
Digital credentials are the electronic equivalent of their physical counterparts.
3
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Digital credentials make use of public key cryptography to provide benefits that their
physical counterparts do not posses. A digital credential is composed of two parts:
a digital certificate and a private key. A digital certificate cannot be forged; a valid
digital certificate can only be created by a valid issuer. The private key is the verifier
of this credential. This verifier is much more effective than the ones found on physical
credentials. The private key never has to be revealed to anyone, but one can prove that
one has possession of it through the use of a digital signature. Digital credentials have
an added insecurity since people are not as well versed in the steps that are needed
to protect them as they are with physical credentials.
1.4

Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives an in-depth

look at a mobile environment and the requirements for a secure repository in that
environment. Chapter 3 gives an overview of existing repositories and how they
measure up to the requirements of Chapter 2. Chapter 4 defines a hybrid repository
and explains how it satisfies the requirements of Chapter 2. Chapters 5-7 present
the design and implementation of Thor, a hybrid repository. Chapter 8 enumerates
future work for this research and Chapter 9 gives the conclusions that follow from
this work.

4

Chapter 2 — Requirements for Secure
Repositories in a Mobile Environment

This research is concerned with keeping credentials safe in a mobile environment.
Secure credential repositories are an ideal candidate for this task due to their effectiveness in the non-mobile environment. However, before these existing repositories
can be examined in the context of a mobile environment it is necessary to first examine a mobile environment and how its underlying assumptions differ from those of a
non-mobile environment.
In this chapter a mobile environment is presented and its assumptions are elucidated and compared to those of a non-mobile environment. As mentioned in Chapter
1, a mobile environment changes many of the assumptions upon which repositories
are built. To compensate for these differences in their underlying foundations this
chapter presents a set of requirements for a secure repository in a mobile environment.
This chapter also delineates the metrics which will be used to determine whether these
requirements are met.
2.1

A Mobile Environment
Cell phones, PDAs, laptops, and many other mobile devices are rapidly permeat-

ing the landscape of personal and business computing. Many of these devices make
use of wireless communication protocols to stay connected to a communications infrastructure, even while on the move. Though ability to use wireless communications
is a valuable trait of many of these devices, even without it they are very beneficial.
These devices automate repetitive tasks as well as store, search, manage, and manipulate a variety of information on behalf of their owners. This information ranges from
simple items like an address book or database to more complicated information like
5
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pictures and audio or video files. People also use portable devices to electronically
purchase items and perform other electronic transactions.
Although the “coolness” of these gadgets plays an important role in the purchase
and use of these devices by individual consumers, they also appeal to many businesses
because they have the potential to increase the productivity of their employees. This
impact is particularly relevant to employees who frequently travel. In the ideal situation an employee can be just as productive while away on travel as he is in his
office. The wireless communications abilities available to these devices enhance these
benefits. When connected, the traveling business person can update the information
and instructions needed for the trip.
Due to the transient nature of mobile devices, they often operate in a myriad of
domains outside of their trusted sphere. As such, there is a need for the mobile user
to receive assurances that strangers can be trusted, as well as to prove that he can
be trusted by those strangers. This need becomes particularly compelling due to the
widespread use of these devices and their role of representing and acting on behalf of
their owners in an electronic context. Digital credentials are a powerful tool in this
regard. Once their safety can be assured, these credentials greatly assist the mobile
user.
In order to be effective, a repository must operate within the constraints of a
mobile environment. Although a mobile environment shares many similarities with
its static cousin, there are still significant differences. These differences fall into the
following four categories:
• Physical security
• Computational constraints
• Connectivity
6
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• Usability
In the following sections, the requirements for a secure credential repository in
a mobile environment are specified. For each requirement that is established one or
more metrics will be given to judge their satisfaction. The metrics are phrased in
the form of a question. An affirmative response to the question posed by the metric
indicates compliance with the requirement.
2.2

Physical Security of the Mobile Device
Mobile devices are generally smaller than non-mobile ones. This difference in

size promotes portability and is part of the allure of these devices. It is also one of
the greatest motivating factors in the design of these devices. Trade-offs are made
between battery life, computational power, weight and form factor (see Section 2.3).
For the most part non-mobile devices do not have the same concerns. They can rely
on a constant source of energy, and smaller is not necessary better.
The size of mobile devices also increases their risk for physical security problems.
For instance, mobile devices can be very easily misplaced or stolen. A misplaced
device in an office or home is more of a nuisance than a security risk. However, if the
device is misplaced or left behind in a public place or while traveling this becomes
much more of a problem. Often times, a device that was believed to have been
misplaced may have indeed been stolen. Mobile devices are very susceptible to theft
because of their small size. Another physical threat to mobile devices is the fact
that they can be easily broken. Whether they are dropped, thrown, or smashed, the
destruction of the device affects the availability of the information contained therein.
In other words, mobile devices are prone to theft, accidental loss, and destruction.
Each of these factors leads to what this research will henceforth refer to as a loss
of the mobile device. A loss of the mobile device suggests that either the entire
device or its contents has been lost, stolen, or broken beyond repair. Concern for
7

CHAPTER 2. REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURE REPOSITORIES IN A
MOBILE ENVIRONMENT
this situation illustrates the first requirement for a secure credential repository in a
mobile environment:
R1 The loss of the mobile device must not equate to a loss of any of a user’s credentials.
A simple metric is used to determine whether this requirement is met:
M1 In the absence of the mobile device, can the contents of the repository be restored
without reissuing all the credentials?
There are various methods that a repository can use to satisfy this metric and
fulfill this requirement. One of the simplest methods is to create an off-device backup.
Ideally, this backup resides in a different physical location than the user. This helps
to ensure that the backup is not subject to the same threat that affected the mobile
device. Although an off-device backup is useful for the accidental loss or destruction
of the device, the restoration and continued use of the the restored credential should
adhere to the following cautionary note.
Cautionary Note
An off-device backup should only be restored if the user can be assured that the
credentials cannot be recovered from the mobile device in question. For example, the
accidental destruction of the device or the contents of its memory is a good candidate
for the use of the backup. However, the theft or loss of the device in a public area is a
poor candidate because there exists the possibility that the contents of the repository
may be recovered by a malicious party. If recovered, an impersonation of the user
by the malicious party may be possible. In this case the user’s credentials and keys
should be revoked and new ones issued. This, of course, applies only to the credentials
that were actually contained in the repository on the device. The user’s credentials
8
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that were not stored on the device in question should not be affected by the loss of
the device. A password change for the repository should occur in this case.
2.3

Computation Constraints of Mobile Devices
A key difference between mobile and non-mobile devices is their computational

and power constraints. Even devices in the mobile arena can vary greatly in their
capabilities. On one side of the spectrum are laptop-class devices with large batteries, powerful processors, and long-range wireless transmitters. These devices can
make use of existing repository technologies with little or no modification in terms of
computational restrictions.
Sensor network motes are on the other end of the mobile device capability spectrum. These devices have small batteries and minimal processor and transmitter
power. These restrictions will not disappear in the near future. As technology improves, motes are more likely to maintain there computational resources and become
smaller in size, rather than maintain their size and increase their computational power.
Although sensor motes represent an extreme end of the capability spectrum, methods
developed for sensor motes could lead to better protocols for devices in the middle of
this spectrum.
One approach to dealing with the limited capabilities of mobile devices is to offload
or share the computational load with a trusted remote agent or proxy. Base stations
are a key element of a sensor network. They can serve as a data collection point
as well as a management system for the entire network. The use of out-of-band
resources makes more sophisticated repositories accessible to devices where they were
previously unavailable.
The computational limitations that exist in mobile devices illustrate the second
requirement:
R2 The repository must function within the computational restrictions of the mobile
9
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device.
Satisfaction of this requirement is based on a two-part metric:
M2a Can the repository be loaded and executed on the device?
M2b If it can be executed, does the response time of the repository exceed an acceptable threshold?
The ability to load and execute on a device is a good indicator that a repository
may meet this requirement. However, being able to execute is only part of the story.
If the repository requires extended periods of computation this will reduce battery
life and response time of the device. Both of these factors contribute greatly to user
frustration.
2.4

Connectivity of Mobile Devices
Due to the transient nature of devices in this environment, they experience various

levels of connectivity at transaction time. Figure 2.1 illustrates three topologies that
effectively categorize the connectivity of a mobile environment: reliably-connected,
unreliably-connected (also called intermittently-connected ), and disconnected access
to a wired infrastructure.
Reliably-connected describes situations in which a user’s device has reliable and
adequate connection bandwidth to a wired infrastructure. The next, intermittentlyconnected, describes any situation in which a user’s device has sporadic connections
with sufficient bandwidth. The connectedness the device in this topology may not
be in control of the user. The final categorization, disconnected, depicts situations in
which the device has no access to a wired infrastructure.
Although there is a wide range in the types of connections available to the reliablyconnect and intermittently-connected topologies the common thread that binds them
10
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Figure 2.1: The three communication topologies of a mobile environment.
is that communication is possible. The bandwidth and latency of that connection
will affect the operational time requirements for a repository that requires external
communication to access credentials at transaction time, but it will still be able to
provide credential availability. This is not the case in the disconnected topology where
the credentials in such a repository are not available. In order to operate effectively in
a mobile environment a user must be able to access his repository independent of the
topology in which his device currently resides. This elucidates the third requirement:
R3 The credentials in the repository must be available, regardless of the current
topology of the mobile device.
The metric for determining whether a repository meets this requirement is simple:
M3 Are the credentials in the repository available at transaction time without a
connection to off-device resources?
If so, then the repository satisfies this requirement. This requirement is intentionally
vague in stating whether or not it requires that ALL the credentials in the repository
11
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be available, regardless of the current topology. A user or organization may wish
to specify that certain credentials should never be available from a mobile device or
while that device is disconnected. Also, due to storage limitations on the device it
may not be possible for a user to have all his credentials stored in such a way that
they are available in the disconnected state. For the purposes of this research, the
availability of a user-defined subset of credentials, regardless of the current topology,
is sufficient to satisfy this requirement.
2.5

Usability
Usability is a key feature to any system that requires user interaction. This is

especially true for mobile devices since they usually rely on more ambiguous methods
of input than the traditional keyboard and mouse, such as character and gesture
recognition. The requirement that a repository be “usable”, though essential to its
acceptance, is subject to many different measurement metrics. Therefore, rather than
require such a condition, this section identifies two requirements that would increase
usability of the repository.
2.5.1

Centralized Management

It is possible for a typical mobile user to possess more than one mobile device and
possibly several non-mobile devices. Even if a separate repository were maintained
on each of these devices, it would be very helpful if all of these repositories were
maintained by a centralized management tool. Credential management includes the
ability to add, remove, and/or modify the credentials in the repository. This tool is
particularly important as the number of credentials for a user increases. This tool can
also assist the user by ensuring that all copies of a user’s credentials are up-to-date,
performing revocation checks on the user’s credential chains, and reminding a user
when credentials are about to expire. The automation of these features is very helpful
for the average user because it automates important tasks that a user may not know
12
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how to do, does not know that he should do, or does not want to be bothered with.
Although there exist a myriad of features that this tool can have, the most important
ability from a usability perspective is:
R4 The repository must have an interface through which users may manage all their
credentials. Changes made here can then be propagated to all of the users’
participating devices.
The metric to verify the fulfillment of this requirement is:
M4 Can the user manage all his credentials in a single location and have the repository propagate those changes to participating devices?
This requirement gives the user the ability to maintain all his credentials from a
single location and have those effects propagated to all his devices. This usability
requirement has close ties to Requirement R1, as the off-device backup that can
satisfy this requirement is an ideal place to create and use such a tool.
2.5.2

Fine-Grained Synchronization

The previous requirement specifies that changes to a user’s repository are to be
propagated to participating devices. There exist many instances in which a user would
not want the entire contents of his credential repository propagated to a particular
mobile device. For example, the storage capacity of that device might be insufficient
to contain the entire contents of a user’s repository or a particular subset of credentials
will never be used on that device by the user. Also, it is a common businesses practice
to prohibit the storage of certain types of sensitive information on mobile devices. A
third consideration is that the synchronization should take the minimal amount of
communication and processing time on the part of the mobile device, in order to
conserve the limited resources of the device.
13

CHAPTER 2. REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURE REPOSITORIES IN A
MOBILE ENVIRONMENT
The manner of repository replication and synchronization is important to devices
in a mobile environment. A repository-level of synchronization, replacing the entire
repository contents when only a portion of the repository has changed, is unacceptable. If a single credential is modified, those changes, and only those changes, should
be propagated to the appropriate devices. This is called a credential-level synchronization.
The need for fine-grained synchronization necessitates the final requirement for a
repository in a mobile environment:
R5 The repository synchronization mechanism must include a granularity that permits synchronization at the credential-level.
The metric to verify the inclusion of credential-level synchronization is:
M5 If a single credential is modified, is that change the only information needed to
update the appropriate repositories?
2.6

Summary of Requirements
A summary of the requirements for a secure credential repository is shown in

Table 2.1.
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Requirements
R1

R2

R3

R4

R5

Metrics

The loss of the mobile device must M1
not equate to a loss of any of a
user’s credentials.

In the absence of the mobile device, can the contents of the
repository be restored without
reissuing all the credentials?
The repository must function M2a Can the repository be loaded and
within the computational restricexecuted on the device?
tions of the mobile device.
M2b If it can be executed, does the response time of the repository exceed an acceptable threshold?
The credentials in the repository M3
Are the credentials in the reposimust be available, regardless of the
tory available at transaction time
current topology of the mobile dewithout a connection to offvice.
device resources?
The repository must have an inter- M4
Can the user manage all his creface through which users may mandentials in a single location and
age all their credentials. Changes
have the repository propagate
made here can then be propagated
those changes to participating deto all of the users’ participating devices?
vices.
The repository synchronization M5
If a single credential is modified,
mechanism must include a granuis that change the only informalarity that permits synchronization
tion needed to update the approat the credential-level.
priate repositories?

Table 2.1: Summary of the requirements for a secure credential repository in a mobile
environment.
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16

Chapter 3 — Secure Repositories

A secure credential repository is a place where credentials are kept safe when not
in use by a protocol. There exist a wide variety of secure credential repositories.
Secure repositories vary greatly in their design, benefits, and shortcomings. Typically
each application or protocol maintains its own private repository. In this chapter,
a sampling of these repositories are presented. Repositories fall into two general
categories: remote and local. Basney et al.[10] and Gupta et al.[15] provide good
introductory overviews of existing secure repositories. This chapter analyzes the
effectiveness of the two types of repositories in a mobile environment based on the
requirements presented in Chapter 2.
3.1

Remote Repositories
The physical analogue of a remote repository is a safe deposit box with physical

credentials stored inside. This box is stored either in a personal safe or in the safe of
a trusted third party. In either case, its location tends to be static. In the case where
the box is guarded by a trusted third party, the contents are either kept a secret from
its guardian or permission is delegated to that party to access the contents on behalf
of the user.
A electronic remote repository resides on a remote device or server and provides a
central location for a user to store and manage his credentials. The remote repository
is administered by a user on a machine of his choosing or he delegates that responsibility to a trusted third party to host it on his behalf. There are basically two different
types of remote repositories. The difference between these two types resides in the
amount of knowledge that the repository maintains regarding the contents of a user’s
credentials. The belief here is that the more a repository knows, the more it can help
17
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Figure 3.1: A typical remote repository. The repository is off-device and is accessible
to an application via an interface and some communications infrastructure, e.g., the
Internet.
the device, both in terms of security and computation. Simply put, if the server has
knowledge of the sensitive information then it should be able to assist the client in
the use of that information. This could be very valuable depending on the limitations
of the mobile device. This method does raise concerns about insider attacks and
claims of non-repudiation. On the other hand, if the repository has no knowledge
of the contents of a user’s credentials (they are encrypted so that the repository has
to treat them as opaque objects), then the security of the credentials resides solely
in the hands of the user. Access to this repository is granted based on an authenticator. This authenticator is a password, biometric, or some other pre-established
relationship the device itself has with the repository.
3.1.1

Virtual Smart Cards

Sandhu et al. [21] defines two types of remote repositories: virtual soft tokens
and virtual smart cards. In the virtual smart card paradigm, the repository is always
18

3.1. REMOTE REPOSITORIES
involved in the use of the private key. This is accomplished by one of two methods.
First, the repository has access to the entire private key and can perform signatures
on behalf of the client, just like a physical smart card. Second, the repository uses
the 3-key RSA algorithm to accomplish a joint signature with the client. Not all
keys, however, can be converted to the 3-key format and this limits the migration of
existing certificates to this system. NSD Security’s Practical PKI [3] is an example
of a virtual smart card that uses the 3-key algorithm.
3.1.2

Virtual Soft Tokens

Virtual soft tokens are a network-based storage solution of sensitive credentials.
In this system the server is oblivious to the actual information that is being stored.
This approach does not have the added benefit of server assistance with the use of the
information, but it does greatly simplify the requirements of the server and greatly
reduces the risk of a malicious server or insider gaining access to a user’s sensitive
credentials. An online server stores the credentials and are only retrievable by an
authorized and authenticated client. This type of repository may store encrypted
items such that a user must provide a decryption key for each item, or it may choose
to release the item in an unencrypted form to the user. MyProxy [19] is an example
of the latter, while Securely Available Credentials (SACRED) [9, 16, 13], Versign
Roaming Service[7], and beTRUSTed’s UniCERT Roaming Profile [1] are examples
of the former. Versign and beTRUSTed both use applets that emulate a smart card
to retrieve and use credentials and keys. SACRED retrieves the encrypted credentials and requires user interaction to decrypt them. A user is, therefore, completely
responsible for the security of the unencrypted data because he is the only one with
access to it.
Ideally, the credentials retrieved from a remote repository are cleared from the
device when the transaction that required them has completed, thus preventing undue
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exposure of the sensitive credentials and keys while on the device. To enhance the
security of the information in the system, the password that is used to decrypt the
credentials should be different than the one that is used to authenticate the client
to the repository. This will ensure that the client does not even tempt the server to
access the sensitive data.
3.1.3

Advantages

A remote repository has several benefits. First, it is always available to the client
(provided the network where the server resides is accessible to the client). A user
is not required to transport his repository with him and it provides a centralized
location to manage credential updates. The remote repository can also be hosted
by a third party, trusted to have a secure system and regular backups of a user’s
information. Problems can arise when the repository is in the possession of a third
party because a malicious insider could erase a user’s data. This should be covered
by a legal obligation between the client and the server. Backups by the server help
to alleviate this danger. One of the greatest benefits of using a remote repository in
conjunction with a mobile device is that if the mobile device is lost, or stolen, the
repository remains safe on the remote server.
3.1.4

Disadvantages

There are several disadvantages which plague remote repositories. They must
be available at transaction time and thus create a dependence on a third party in
order to complete the transaction. If the online repository is not accessible from
where the mobile device is located, it is useless. An online repository creates an
additional communication overhead: each time a transaction requires credentials, the
mobile device must interact with it. An online remote repository also creates a highly
attractive target for attack.
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3.1.5

Does a Remote Repository Meet the Requirements of a Mobile
Environment?

In terms of the first three requirements for a secure credential repository in a
mobile environment, remote repositories fare quite well. By their nature, this type
of repository provides an off-device backup that is accessible even if the entire mobile device is destroyed, thus satisfying Requirement R1. Some remote repositories,
though not all, also have the capacity to offload or share computational tasks with the
mobile device. This is definitely a good indicator for the satisfaction of Requirement
R2. Also, when dealing with a remote repository it is important to note that only
the client side software must satisfy requirement R2.
In terms of usability, remote repositories score very well. By design, all of a
user’s mobile devices access the same repository. That repository serves as the central management tool. Because there is a single repository there is no need for the
synchronization between other repositories, other than for backup purposes. Remote
repositories satisfy both usability requirements, R4 and R5.
Unfortunately, remote repositories require a connection to an online component
at transaction time. This is a violation of Requirement R3.
A pure remote repository solution, though able to provide several advantageous
features, is insufficient to meet the needs of a repository in a mobile environment.
Table 3.1 shows a summary of how a remote repository measures up to the requirements for a secure credential repository in a mobile environment.
3.2

Local Repositories
The most common type of repository is the local repository. This repository is

collocated on a user’s device with the rest of his applications. The physical counterpart of a local repository is the wallet. The physical credentials in the wallet are safe
while the wallet is physically secure. A wallet can also be stolen, lost, or destroyed.
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Requirements
R1

R2

R3

R4

R5

Metrics

The loss of the mobile device M1
must not equate to a loss of any
of a user’s credentials.

In the absence of the mobile device, can the contents of the yes
repository be restored without
reissuing all the credentials?
The repository must function M2a Can the repository be loaded
within the computational reand executed on the device?
yes
strictions of the mobile device.
M2b If it can be executed, does the
response time of the repository yes
exceed an acceptable threshold?
The credentials in the reposi- M3
Are the credentials in the repostory must be available, regarditory available at transaction no
less of the current topology of
time without a connection to
the mobile device.
off-device resources?
The repository must have an M4
Can the user manage all his creinterface through which users
dentials in a single location and yes
may manage all their credenhave the repository propagate
tials. Changes made here can
those changes to participating
then be propagated to all of the
devices?
users’ participating devices.
The repository synchronization M5
If a single credential is modimechanism must include a
fied, is that change the only in- yes
granularity that permits synformation needed to update the
chronization at the credentialappropriate repositories?
level.

Table 3.1: Summary the fulfillment of the requirements for a secure credential repository a mobile environment by a remote repository.
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Figure 3.2: A typical local repository. The repository is on-device and is accessible
directly by the application.

However, unlike a wallet the local repository can be “locked” so even if it is lost or
stolen its contents will not be easily accessed.
A local repository is usually some sort of database, file, or set of files that is
encrypted in order to restrict access to an authorized user. Access to this repository
is granted based on an authenticator. This authenticator is a password, biometric,
etc. A local repository may store encrypted items such that a user must provide a
decryption key for each item, or it may release the item in an unencrypted form to
the user. The latter requires that a user only have one password for complete access,
while the former requires a user to supply a password for the repository and for each
item stored therein. As the number of items stored in the repository increases so does
the number of passwords that a user must remember. This leads to several problems
(see Section 6.2). There are many standards in place for local repositories such as
PKCS#8, a standard format for storing a private key, and PKCS#12 and #15 which
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are used to store more generic forms of sensitive information. The Java KeyStore, an
encrypted database, capable of storing a variety of items, is also representative of a
local repository.
3.2.1

Secure Modules

Another type of local repository stores the sensitive data in an encrypted form on a
secure module that is attached to a user’s device. An example of this is Sony’s Memory
Stick. Through the use of MagicGate [8], a Memory Stick can store its contents in
an encrypted form and release them only to a user that successfully authenticates
himself. Another secure module that is used with mobile devices is a cryptographic
smart card. Smart cards have several advantages over other local repositories. Like
other repositories, access to the card is protected by a password or biometric. The
private keys never leave the card since all necessary processing can be done within
the card. Unfortunately, the space available on these cards is very limited. There is
normally about 32KB of space for both an application and its data.
3.2.2

Advantages

Local repositories have several advantages that make them very well suited for
the protection of sensitive electronic information. First and foremost is the fact that
they reside locally on a user’s machine. The credential repository, therefore, remains
in the physical protection of the user. The locality of the repository also lends itself
well to matters of latency. The repository is on the user’s device and therefore access
should be quite quick compared to a remote solution that requires the overhead of
the establishing and communicating over an encrypted channel.
3.2.3

Disadvantages

Several disadvantages impact the effectiveness of local repositories. First and
foremost the local repository must be present with a user to be of any use. Also, the
loss of the device is equivalent to the loss of the repository and, without an off-device
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backup, the contents of the repository must be reacquired from their respective issuers.
Loss of the local repository to a malicious entity also makes the repository subject to
an off-line brute-force attack. This attack may not yield anything within the lifetime
of a user if a sufficiently strong password is selected, however if a weak password was
chosen by a user, then such an attack could yield very fruitful results. Enforcement
of a strong password policy is essential to the security of a user’s information.
Another problem is synchronization. If a user has several devices, he has to
replicate his sensitive information on every device. When a credential expires, is
revoked, or for any reason needs to be updated or removed, the changes must be
propagated to every one of a user’s devices. This could be a costly and time-consuming
process, due to the lack of centralized management. Also, the security of a local
repository can vary from device to device.
3.2.4

Does a Local Repository Meet the Requirements of a Mobile Environment?

In terms of computational resources, local repositories tend to be simple, yet
secure. The use of an attached secure module also assists the mobile device with
repository related computation. Local repositories easily satisfy Requirement R2.
Since a repository of this type either resides on the device itself or in an attached
module, all necessary communication is accomplished independently of the current
communications topology of the device. This feature provides guaranteed satisfaction
of R3.
Unfortunately, because the repository contents reside entirely on the local device,
the loss of the device equates to the loss of all of a user’s credentials. This is a
violation of Requirement R1. This violation can have exceptions. For example, it
could be argued that an off-device backup could be created of the local repository,
thus fulfilling this requirement. Though this is possible, it is the exception, rather
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than the rule, that such a backup would be part of the normal operation of a local
repository. (This idea will be explored in greater detail below when Requirements
R4 and R5 are discussed.)
It could also be argued that the use of a secure module should be considered an
off-device backup. Although this is conceptually valid, in practice the secure module
is usually located in close proximity to the mobile device, if not always attached.
Although the repository is conceptually “off the device” it will most likely suffer the
same fate as the device itself. Even if nothing bad were to happen the device, the
secure module has the same chances of being lost, stolen, or broken as does the mobile
device.
In terms of the usability requirements, local repositories do not fare very well, since
they are generally self-contained units. For the most part, they do not even have the
ability to communicate with other repositories. Synchronization is usually performed
in local repositories by performing full copies of its contents. Local repositories offer
no centralized management nor fine-grained synchronization and therefore do not
satisfy Requirements R4 and R5.
A pure local repository solution, though able to provide several advantageous
features, is insufficient to meet the needs of a repository in a mobile environment.
Table 3.2 shows a summary of how a local repository measures up to the requirements for a secure credential repository in a mobile environment.
3.3

Summary of Existing Repositories
Both types of current repository solutions have been explored and compared to the

requirements for a secure credential repository. Neither of these two types adequately
meet the requirements that have been established in Chapter 2. Figure 3.3 shows
how these two types of repositories cover the requirement space.
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Figure 3.3: The requirement space contains five different requirements. The remote
repository covers all of the requirements except R3. The local repository covers
Requirements R2 and R3.
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Requirements
R1

R2

R3

R4

R5

Metrics

The loss of the mobile device M1
must not equate to a loss of any
of a user’s credentials.

In the absence of the mobile device, can the contents of the no
repository be restored without
reissuing all the credentials?
The repository must function M2a Can the repository be loaded
within the computational reand executed on the device?
yes
strictions of the mobile device.
M2b If it can be executed, does the
response time of the repository yes
exceed an acceptable threshold?
The credentials in the reposi- M3
Are the credentials in the repostory must be available, regarditory available at transaction no
less of the current topology of
time without a connection to
the mobile device.
off-device resources?
The repository must have an M4
Can the user manage all his creinterface through which users
dentials in a single location and no
may manage all their credenhave the repository propagate
tials. Changes made here can
those changes to participating
then be propagated to all of the
devices?
users’ participating devices.
The repository synchronization M5
If a single credential is modimechanism must include a
fied, is that change the only in- no
granularity that permits synformation needed to update the
chronization at the credentialappropriate repositories?
level.

Table 3.2: Summary the fulfillment of the requirements for a secure credential repository a mobile environment by a local repository.
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Both local and remote repositories have their benefits and drawbacks. Local repositories have very little communication overhead and do not require access to an online
server at the time of the transaction. However, they also require that a user bring the
repository with him, and the propagation of updates in this model can become complicated. Remote repositories, on the other hand, always have up-to-date credentials
and allow a user to access those credentials from any device. Since the device contains no sensitive credentials, when the device is lost, nothing but the device is lost.
Unfortunately, the communication overheard, accessibility, and availability issues can
limit the effectiveness of online repositories in a mobile environment.
Due to these limitations, neither a pure local nor remote repository meets all of the
usage requirements of a mobile environment. This suggests the creation of a new type
of repository, one better suited to the demands of this environment. This new type
of repository must allow a user to maintain a safe copy of his sensitive information in
a secure remote location, while giving him the option to create a local cached copy
for situations in which the mobile device will be in a disconnected state.
This research proposes the creation of a new type of repository called the hybrid
repository. A hybrid repository is a combination of the two existing repository types
(see Figure 4.1). This union leads to the elimination of many of the drawbacks
inherent in these two types of repositories (see Figure 4.2). The hybrid repository
acts as a strict remote repository, a local repository (a full copy of credentials still
resides in the remote repository), or a mix of the two. This configurable capability
gives the user the flexibility to control the availability of his credentials. The user can
also choose different local repositories depending on the restrictions of his devices.
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Figure 4.1: A typical hybrid repository. The repository has on-device and off-device
components and is accessible by an application through an interface.
Simply stated, a hybrid repository gives the mobile user the power and flexibility to
protect and use his credentials while in a mobile environment.
The physical analogies presented in the previous chapter still remain valid. A
hybrid repository combines the concepts of the wallet and safe deposit box. The user
stores the “original” credentials in the safe deposit box. In the case where the safe
deposit box will be inaccessible for a time, or simply for convenience, the user creates a
“certified copy” and carries it in his wallet. The “original” credentials always remains
in the safe deposit box as a backup in case the wallet is ever lost, stolen, or destroyed.
4.1

Existing Repositories that Resemble a Hybrid Repository
The Entrust TruePass architecture [2] integrates many ideas of the hybrid repos-

itory. TruePass is designed to give “strong authentication, digital signatures and
end-to-end encryption to the Web Portal.” It allows a user to store his Digital ID as
a roaming profile, in the Windows digital ID store, on a smart card, or as an encrypted
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Figure 4.2: The requirement space contains five different requirements. The remote
repository cover all of the requirements except R3. The local repository covers Requirements R2 and R3. The hybrid repository covers all of the requirements.

file on a user’s hard drive. This allows a user great flexibility to choose the manner
in which his credentials are available, but restricts a user’s options in other areas.
Although the Entrust TruePass system has many attributes of a hybrid repository,
it also has several aspects that may make it unappealing to mobile users. The main
aspect that should dissuade the average mobile user from adopting this system is its
blurring between the concepts of repository and protocol. The Entrust repository
is only accessible by Entrust Applications which, in turn, only communicate with
Entrust server-side modules. The user cannot make these credential available to the
protocol of his choosing. This is an essential feature to a general-purpose repository
because it is an unreasonable assumption to believe that every party a user wishes to
communicate with is Entrust-enabled. This repository is thus unsuitable for general
use as a secure credential repository in a mobile environment.
RSA Keon Web PassPort [6] also integrates the many concepts from the hybrid
repository. It stores credentials on a remote server and uses a browser applet to
emulate a smart card. This applet is accessible by any user application via PKCS#11
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or the Microsoft Cryptographic API. Although this emulated smart card is a type of
local repository, it is never written to persistent local storage. The ability to create
and use persistent local storage is an important attribute of the hybrid repository
because it allows accessibility in the disconnected topology (see Requirement R3).
4.2

Does a Hybrid Repository Meet the Requirements of a Mobile Environment?
A hybrid repository provides an off-device backup that is accessible even if the

entire mobile device is destroyed, thus satisfying Requirement R1. The specific implementation of this repository greatly affects the fulfillment of Requirement R2, but
the fact that current repository technologies function well given computational constraints of a mobile environment is a good indicator that the hybrid repository will
also perform similarly.
In terms of Requirement R3, the remote aspect of the hybrid repository is not
much help. However, the local aspect permits all necessary communication to be
accomplished independently of the current communications topology of the device,
thus providing satisfaction of this requirement.
In terms of usability, hybrid repositories have the potential to score very well.
Through the remote aspect, a location is provided to serve as the central management
point and facilitate the creation of a central management tool. The creation of such
a tool, however, is implementation specific. The satisfaction of Requirements R4 and
R5 is therefore not a guarantee for the hybrid repository, but the resources needed
in order to implement the functionality are available.
Table 4.1 provides a summary of how a hybrid repository measures up to the
requirements for a secure credential repository in a mobile environment.
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Requirements
R1

R2

R3

R4

R5

Metrics

The loss of the mobile device M1
must not equate to a loss of any
of a user’s credentials.

In the absence of the mobile device, can the contents of the yes
repository be restored without
reissuing all the credentials?
The repository must function M2a Can the repository be loaded
within the computational reand executed on the device?
yes
strictions of the mobile device.
M2b If it can be executed, does the
response time of the repository yes
exceed an acceptable threshold?
The credentials in the reposi- M3
Are the credentials in the repostory must be available, regarditory available at transaction yes
less of the current topology of
time without a connection to
the mobile device.
off-device resources?
The repository must have an M4
Can the user manage all his creinterface through which users
dentials in a single location and yes1
may manage all their credenhave the repository propagate
tials. Changes made here can
those changes to participating
then be propagated to all of the
devices?
users’ participating devices.
The repository synchronization M5
If a single credential is modimechanism must include a
fied, is that change the only in- yes1
granularity that permits synformation needed to update the
chronization at the credentialappropriate repositories?
level.

1

The creation of a centralized management tool is not guaranteed by the hybrid repository,
but the resources needed in order to implement the functionality are available.

Table 4.1: Summary the fulfillment of the requirements for a secure credential repository a mobile environment by a hybrid repository.
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Chapter 5 — Thor

The creation of a hybrid repository presents several interesting challenges. This research presents a method of dealing with these challenges by leverage existing repositories. Many effective local and remote repositories already exist, although no single
one satisfies all five of the requirements for a secure repository in a mobile environment. It makes sense to leverage the strengths and benefits of existing systems by
creating a way to combine different existing repositories into a single virtual repository. Such a system would allow a user to configure the underlying local and remote
repositories used based on his personal situations and needs. A user also has the
option to switch the underlying repositories without having to change the way that
he interacts with the virtual repository. The prototype system is called Thor (The
hybrid online repository). The following sections present the additional goals of this
prototype, a repository interface for combining existing repositories, and the system
design for Thor. Chapter 6 delineates Thor’s additional management enhancements
and security features and Chapter 7 explores the reference implementation of Thor.
5.1

Goals
Three goals govern the design and implementation of Thor:

G1 All five requirements for a secure credential repository in a mobile environment
must be satisfied.
G2 There must be no modifications required to the existing repository implementations.
G3 Where possible, increase usability and security of existing repositories without
modifying them.
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The motivation of the first goal is obvious and part of the overall goal of this
research. The second goal promotes the use of existing systems, which already perform
well in a non-mobile environment, eases the transition from purely local and remote
repositories and facilitates the adoption of this system. The third goal not only
serves to improve the safety of the credentials stored in the repository, but is also an
attractive feature to promote this system’s adoption and to inject new ideas into the
credential repository field.
5.2

Repository Interface
Thor specifies an interface through which preexisting local and remote repositories

can be combined. Thor uses this interface to control and interact with each repository.
Thor, the local repository, and any other user applications reside on the local device,
while the remote repository resides at an off-device location accessible via a wired
infrastructure. Ideally, an application, authorized by the user, accesses the credentials
by interfacing directly with Thor or by using the local repository directly.
This interface exploits the fact that every repository provides the same basic
functionally: the ability to store and retrieve credentials. Although the actual names
and parameters of these operations vary from repository to repository, all repositories
expose an API that allows a user to accomplish the following three operations:
1. Put an encrypted credential in the repository with a unique identifier.
2. Get an encrypted credential from the repository based on a unique identifier.
3. Delete an encrypted credential in the repository based on a unique identifier.
In order to allow repositories to seamlessly interoperate within Thor, it is essential that an interface be created that standardizes these three operations. Figure 5.1
presents the Java-style repository interface that is specified by Thor. In order for a
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public interface Repository {
public void put(byte[] item, String identifier) throws RepositoryException;
public byte[] get(String identifier) throws RepositoryException;
public void delete(String identifier) throws RepositoryException;
}
Figure 5.1: This is the Java-style interface defined by Thor. This interface exploits
that fact that all repositories have three basic functions: get, put, and delete.
new repository to be integrated with Thor, a wrapper that maps the methods and
parameters of the Thor interface to the methods and parameters of that repository’s
existing interface must be created. By forcing the creation of a wrapper that implements Thor’s repository interface, a level of abstraction is produced that permits
Thor to use a repository independent of its actual implementation. This also allows
a user to easily switch the underlying repositories used by Thor without having to
change Thor itself.
Each repository remains usable without the Thor client interface module (through
its traditional interface) unless Thor’s password manager was used to remember repository authentication passwords (see Section 7.5). In this case the appropriate credential decryption keys must be retrieved from Thor.
Several other operations are required in order to setup and clean-up Thor’s interaction with the underlying repositories. The following operations are handled during
the instantiation and finalization of the interface:
1. Establish a connection to the repository.
2. Authenticate a user to the repository, and vice-versa (specify root certificates
that are trusted for this repository).
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Figure 5.2: Thor’s design is simple. Rather than create the new local and remote
components required by a hybrid repository, Thor leverages existing repositories as
its local and remote elements. The remote element is called the root repository node.
The local element is called the leaf repository node.
3. Disconnect from the repository
5.3

Design
The overall design of Thor is intentionally simple (see Figure 5.2). As described

in Section 5.2 Thor uses the repository interface to combine the repositories. The
following sections describe how these repositories are organized and combined.
5.3.1

Repository Tree

Thor organizes its repositories into a tree structure (see Figure 5.3). The top node
in the tree is called the root repository node. There can be only one root repository
node. The other nodes in the tree structure are called leaf repository nodes. There is
no limit on the number of leave nodes.
The root repository node provides a location for a centralized management point
(see Section 5.3.3) and an off-device backup. The types of repositories that can fulfill
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Figure 5.3: The repository tree structure used by Thor. The top node in the tree is
the root repository node. Its children are called leaf repository nodes. There can be
any number of leaf nodes, even on the same device, but only one root node.
this role are explored in the next section. Possible future extensions to this node
include the addition of a backup root node, or a multi-node root repository that
would operate in a similar fashion to RAID.
Although the use of an online remote repository creates an attractive target for
attackers, it also provides a centralized and unified location to prevent and deal with
those attacks.
The leaf repository node always has an associated root repository node. The
addition of new credentials to the repository via a leaf node, or changes made to
existing credentials, must pass through the root node to be made available to other
leaves. Constraints and recommendations for leaf node repositories are given in the
next section. Although there is no inter-leaf communication or synchronization ability,
possible future extensions could include this ability on a limited basis.
The root repository node provides an off-device backup suitable for the satisfaction
of Requirement R1. The presence of a leaf repository node provides a local copy of the
user’s credentials that are accessible without any need to communicate with the root
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repository node. Although the user may choose a only a subset of all his credentials
to reside in the leaf node, the guaranteed availability of that subset is sufficient for
the satisfaction of Requirement R3.
5.3.2

Repository Selection Constraints

The second requirement for a secure credential repository gives the only overarching constraint on the selection of the repositories that are integrated in any particular
Thor system. Requirement R2 dictates that the repository must function within the
computational constraints of a mobile environment.
Although every repository provides the same basic functionally, as described in
Section 5.2, that does not mean that every repository is a suitable candidate for the
root repository node. In order to effectively perform the function of the root repository node, a repository must satisfy the following constraints. First, only remote
repositories can be assigned the role of a root repository node. Second, a complete
copy of a user’s credentials must be able to be stored in the repository. This allows
a complete remote backup to be made and is also utilized as the centralized synchronization point. Third, the entire credential must be retrievable from the server. This
allows a user to populate his local repository with the necessary credentials and keys
for operation in the disconnected topology. Because of these last two constraints, the
virtual soft token style of remote repositories is better suited than the virtual smart
card style. Finally, the remote repository should treat the credentials as opaque encrypted objects. This will increase the strength of non-repudiation claims because
only the client will be able to access his sensitive credentials in an unencrypted form.
Since a leaf node resides on the mobile device it makes the most sense conceptually
that a leaf node be a local repository. However, a remote repository that is hosted
on the local device can also produce the desired effect. Based on this idea, a leaf
repository will not have any additional constraints. This research recommends that
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1. The repository be a remote repository.
2. The repository must be able to store a complete copy of a user’s credentials.
3. The repository must permit retrieval of the entire credential.
4. The remote repository should treat credentials as opaque objects.
Figure 5.4: Summary of the constraints of the root repository node.
a local repository be used, however the final choice lies with the preferences of the
user.
Although the tree structure used by Thor is an ideal arrangement for the integration of a centralized management utility, further elucidation of the centralized
management provided by Thor is needed before it can be determined whether this
repository system satisfies Requirements R4 and R5.
5.3.3

Centralized Management Utility

Requirement R4 specifies that the repository must provide a single location or
interface through which a user’s credentials are managed and any changes are propagated to the participating mobile devices. The root repository node provides the
excellent foundation for such a task. This node already provides an interface to manage the credentials — all that remains is to modify the root and leaf repository nodes
so they can communicate. Unfortunately, this method for the creation of a centralized management utility violates Goal G2, which dictates that no changes should be
made to existing repository implementations.
Thor’s Central Management Utility provides an innovative solution to Requirement R4 without violating Goal G2. This utility is a client-side software agent.
This utility can connect to any of the user’s participating repository on the user’s
behalf. This connection uses the existing repository interface provided by the specific
repository and thus does not require modification to any existing repositories.
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The current version of the management utility connects to the root repository
node, the leaf repository node collocated on the same device, or both at the same
time. This utility provides a uniform interface to all the user’s repositories.
When the connection to the desired repository is made, the management utility
retrieves its meta-data that is stored there. This meta-data is stored as a “credential”
in the repository and contains a list of credential identifiers and modification dates (see
Section 5.3.4 for more detailed information). This list is used to display the repository
contents as well as limited credential information: issuer subject, expiration date, etc.
When connected to the root repository node, the user is permitted to manage
and access the credentials stored there. Changes made while connected to this node
are recorded so leaf nodes can be informed of the modifications when they connect.
These alterations are recorded in the utility’s meta-data.
When connected to a leaf repository node, the user is also permitted to manage
and access the credentials stored there. Changes made while connected to this node
are also recorded in the utility’s meta-data. However, as stated in Section 5.3.1, if a
credential is to be made available to other leaf repository nodes, then it must first be
uploaded to the root repository node.
When the user is connected to both the root repository node and a leaf node, the
Central Management Utility compares the information contained in the meta-data
from each repository and notes the differences. Only when the utility is connected to
both the root repository node and a leaf node can synchronization occur.
Thor uses a simple, yet effective method for synchronization. If the leaf repository
has credentials that are not in the root repository the user is prompted to determine
whether it should be uploaded. If a new copy of a credential exists in either the leaf
or root node, then the old copy is updated. If the root repository has credentials that
the leaf does not, by default no action is taken. Credentials from the root repository
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are only downloaded to the leaf repository on direct command of the user. This
preserves the ability of the user to store a subset of his credentials on the device.
Thor’s synchronization provides a credential-level granularity in compliance with
Requirement R5. When a credential is updated, only the information needed to
update that credential is transmitted. In this case, it is necessary to transmit the
entire credential. This new copy will overwrite the old copy.
In summary, Thor’s Central Management Utility provides a single location for
a user to manage all his credentials and propagate those changes to the user’s participating devices. This fulfills the conditions dictated by Requirement R4. This
utility accomplishes its tasks without any need to modify the existing repositories,
thus adhering to Goal G2.
5.3.4

Meta-Data

Meta-data is stored in the repositories used by Thor and contains information vital
to the task of the Central Management Utility. The meta-data is also a time/resource
saving mechanism. A list of the entire repository contents, with valuable descriptive
information, can be retrieved without having to actually look at any of the credentials
in the repository. This section describes how the meta-data is structured and what
it contains.
Thor’s meta-data is an XML document. It is stored and retrieved from the repository just like an ordinary credential. In fact, the repository shouldn’t be able to
distinguish between the meta-data and other credentials. In the event that metadata is larger than the credential size limit imposed by a repository it can be split
into multiple files and later recombined.
The basic format of the meta-data XML document contains the following tags:
<RepositoryMetaData> This tag is the root element of the document. It has one
and only one child, the credentials tag.
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<credentials> This tag has zero or more credential tags as children.
<credential> This tag represents a single credential in the repository. It has two
attributes: realID and lastModified. realID is the unique identifier for this
credential. lastModified contains the timestamp of the last modification date
of this credential. This tag has zero or more instances of the credentialInfo tag
as its children.
<credentialInfo> This tag contains credential specific information. This tag has
two attributes: name and value. name is the identifier for the information
contained in contents of value. This tag has no children.

The credential identifier in <credential> is a user specified unique identifier. It
is recommended that this identifier be something more descriptive than “cred1”.
Something like “Online banking authentication” is much better. This name is used not
only for easy user selection and management, but also for synchronization purposes.
The date contained in the lastModified attribute of <credential> should be accurate
to the nearest minute and contain info about the time zone of this value.
The credentialInfo tags contain a set of attribute/value pairs. These values represent values of the credential that the management utility automatically collects when
the credential is first uploaded as well as user-defined and entered values. Figure
5.5 is a list of common attributes in an X.509v3 credential. Figure 5.6 is a sample
meta-data file in the basic format.
If no meta-data exists in the repository, there are two simple procedures to create
it. The user can either enter all the information in by himself, or the management
utility can auto-detect the contents of the repository. Both methods involve downloading, examining each credential, and the creation of the appropriate tags in the
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1. Issuer
2. Subject
3. Valid from
4. Valid to
5. Serial Number
Figure 5.5: A list of common attributes in a X.509v3 credential. These values are
automatically detected and stored in the meta-data when the credential is first uploaded.
XML meta-data document. The time required depends on the number of credentials
in the repository.
This section has presented the basic format of the meta data. The enhancements
of Chapter 6 require additions to the basic meta-data. These additions are elucidated
in Section 6.4.
5.4

Does Thor Meet the Requirements of a Mobile Environment?
As a hybrid repository, Thor automatically has Requirements R1, R2 and R3 ful-

filled. Thor’s Central Management Utility provides satisfaction for Requirements R4
and R5. Table 5.1 provides a summary of how Thor measures up to the requirements
for a secure credential repository in a mobile environment.
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<RepositoryMetaData>
<credentials>
<credential realID=“LMC Employee” lastModified=“2004-05-24T19:33:06-0700”>
<credentialInfo name=“Issuer” value=“Lucky Moose Consulting”/>
<credentialInfo name=“Subject” value=“Doc Hopper”/>
...
</credential>
<credential realID=“ACM” lastModified=“2004-12-31T13:31:02-0700”>
<credentialInfo name=“Issuer” value=“ACM Membership Deptartment”/>
...
</credential>
<credential realID=“IEEE” lastModified=“2003-09-22T05:54:02-0700”/ >
...
</credentials>
</RepositoryMetaData>

Figure 5.6: A sample meta-data file created by Thor’s Central Management Utility.
This is the basic format for this file (see Section 6.4 for an extended version).
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Requirements
R1

R2

R3

R4

R5

Metrics

The loss of the mobile device M1
must not equate to a loss of any
of a user’s credentials.

In the absence of the mobile device, can the contents of the yes
repository be restored without
reissuing all the credentials?
The repository must function M2a Can the repository be loaded
within the computational reand executed on the device?
yes
strictions of the mobile device.
M2b If it can be executed, does the
response time of the repository yes
exceed an acceptable threshold?
The credentials in the reposi- M3
Are the credentials in the repostory must be available, regarditory available at transaction yes
less of the current topology of
time without a connection to
the mobile device.
off-device resources?
The repository must have an M4
Can the user manage all his creinterface through which users
dentials in a single location and yes
may manage all their credenhave the repository propagate
tials. Changes made here can
those changes to participating
then be propagated to all of the
devices?
users’ participating devices.
The repository synchronization M5
If a single credential is modimechanism must include a
fied, is that change the only in- yes
granularity that permits synformation needed to update the
chronization at the credentialappropriate repositories?
level.

Table 5.1: Summary the fulfillment of the requirements for a secure credential repository a mobile environment by Thor.

47

CHAPTER 5. THOR

48

Chapter 6 — Security and Usability Enhancements

With an eye to fulfilling Goal G3, this chapter demonstrates how the repository
abstraction and central management provided by Thor enables the integration of
usability and security enhancements into the underlying repositories without their
modification. The following sections delineate the scope and benefits of three such
enhancements: 1) Organization of the credentials; 2) Password management; and
3) Credential identifier obfuscation. Each of these enhancements are integrated into
Thor’s Central Management Utility. The final section in this chapter presents the
modifications needed to the basic meta-data structure presented in Section 5.3.4 to
enable these enhancements.
6.1

Organization of Credentials
When working with multiple credentials, it is useful to have a method of organiza-

tion for those credentials. The centralized management utility of Thor allows a user
to create groups for the credentials in his repositories. These groups are subsets of the
set of all of a user’s credentials and they need not be mutually exclusive. The default
group is called “ALL”. This group contains all the credentials in the repository.
An example of a logical division for credentials groups is their usage context. For
example, groups can be created for business, e-commerce, medical, military, educational, government, and/or personal use. Groups based on context allow a user to
quickly specify the retrieval of credentials based on the transaction he is performing
or will perform in the future. Groups can also be created based on the application
that will be using them. It makes sense that an application for e-commerce should not
require access to non-related credentials. The credentials are, of course, only as safe
as the weakest application that has access to them. Limiting the credentials accessible
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to an application limits the vulnerability to a user’s most sensitive credentials.
The creation of groups is accomplished by a virtual organization of the credentials.
In other words, the credential organization that is created by a user is not necessarily
reflected in the actual physical storage of the credentials within the repositories. This
organizational structure is stored persistently within Thor as part of the meta-data
stored in each repository(see Section 6.4).
The creation of credential groups creates another area for synchronization. If a
group is expanded or shrunk on the root repository node, the changes to both the
group and the credentials can be automatically extended to the repository nodes when
they connect.
6.2

Password Management
The grouping capabilities of the centralized management utility increases the us-

ability of the existing repositories. Also, by dictating which applications have access
to which credentials it increases the security of credentials while on the local device.
These improvements do not, however, increase the security of the credentials that
reside on the remote repository node. An effective way to increase the security of
the credentials on the root repository node, as well as the leaf repository node, is
to encrypt each credential with a strong, high-entropy password. This makes each
credential as hard to break as any other. This is especially effective in thwarting an
insider attack on the root repository node if it is hosted by a third party.
Unfortunately, it is also very hard for the average user to remember such a password. This problem is compounded when multiple such passwords are required to be
memorized by a user. This creates a significant management problem that usually
results in a user writing down his strong passwords in a non-secure place. In this case,
it is highly beneficial to have a software agent to act on behalf of a user and remember
the decryption passwords for each credential. A user then has to remember only one
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password to authenticate himself to the software agent. The strength of this entire
system resides in the strength of the password to authenticate to the software agent.
Since there is only one password to remember, it could be enforced to be strong but
still not be too difficult to remember.
The idea of protecting many passwords with a single password is not a new concept. Many systems, e.g., Password Safe [4], have been designed to accomplish this
very idea. It is obvious, of course, that the security of the whole system lies in the
strength of the single password. No matter how strong the other passwords are, they
can all be accessed via the single master password. Given its sensitive contents, the
password file is an ideal candidate for attack.
Several disadvantages exist with respect to the password management scheme as
described above. If the password manager is lost, destroyed, or otherwise unavailable,
having such difficult passwords for each credential will avail a user nothing as his data
is all but destroyed as well; the data is encrypted and the key to unlock it is itself
locked and may never be recovered. This raises concerns about its availability and
legitimate accessibility.
The meta-data of the management utility is an ideal location to store the password
management information. Since there is information stored about every credential in
meta-data it is simple to add another piece of information that contains the encryption key for that credential. Because the meta-data is specific to the repository node
in which it resides, the root repository node contains a collection of all the credential encryption keys, while the leaf nodes contain only the keys that pertain to the
credentials stored on that node.
6.2.1

Password Recovery

The root repository node provides a “backup” for all the password manager information. However, what is to be done if a user’s password is forgotten? Certainly
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a user does not want give his password to a third party for safe keeping. This type
of password backup scheme allows the third party to access his sensitive information,
thus enabling the third party to impersonate the user. The password cannot be simply reset because it is needed to unlock the decryption keys stored in the encrypted
meta-data. An encrypted backup copy of the original password must be stored. This
solution raises two concerns: 1. Where is this backup copy stored? and 2. What key
is used to encrypt it?
To answer the first concern, the backup password should not be exclusively stored
locally because the loss of the device equates to a loss of the backup password. A
copy of the backup password must therefore be stored off-device. The root repository
node makes an ideal candidate for this storage. If the password to the root repository
is also lost, it can be reset by whatever means the remote repository has established
for dealing with forgotten passwords, thus enabling the retrieval of a copy of the
encrypted backup password. In regards to the second concern, great care must be
taken in the selection of the encryption key. If a password-derived key is used to
encrypt the backup password, what is to be done if this password is also forgotten?
This train of thought begins an endless loop and at some point a limiting threshold
must be set.
Many online systems, in the event of a forgotten password, ask a user a question
about his personal history. A correct answer re-enables a user’s access to the system.
Frykholm and Juels [14] propose an enhancement to this system that allows a highentropy key to be derived from a certain percentage of correct responses to a sequence
of questions. This derived key is an ideal candidate to encrypt the backup password
because it provides a user the ability to recover a password without interaction with
a third party. It also provides an increased probability of supplying the information
required to successfully retrieve a password.
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Although the integration of this multiple question password scheme would be very
beneficial, its implementation is beyond the scope of this research. The current implementation of the management utility includes a single question password generation
scheme. A future extension will integrate the scheme presented by Frykholm and
Juels.

6.3

Credential Identifier Obfuscation
The repository interface in Section 5.2 specifies that there must exist a unique

identifier for each item in the repository that enables the client and server to uniquely
identify a specific information package. Although the credentials that are uploaded are
encrypted, this identifier could leak sensitive information when the mere existence of
a credential is sensitive. For example, if a label says, “Online banking authentication
credential” it may prove to attract attention and become the focus of an attacker.
A label of nonsensical characters such as “JMVRYIKG/GGFBN25” reveals nothing
about the contents of the information package. This is called credential identifier
obfuscation.
The use of non-descriptive identifiers is particularly important in helping to prevent a malicious insider or someone who has broken into the repository from focusing
his attack on an obviously valuable target. To be effective this obfuscation should
be done on all credentials. Since these nonsensical names mean nothing, it is difficult for a user to remember the mapping of identifiers to credentials. A mapping of
meaningful credential identifiers to the randomly generated obfuscated ones is easily
stored with the repository meta-data. In the management utility this feature is completely automated and does not require any user intervention. Since the repository
meta-data is a very attractive target, it is also included in this identifier obfuscation.
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6.4

Modifications to Meta-Data
In order to implement these enhancements, several new tags must be specified

for the meta-data XML document. The extended format of the meta-data XML
document contains the following tags and tag modifications:
<RepositoryMetaData> This tag is extended to have two more children: <groups>
and <moreMetaData>.
<groups> This new tag represents the collection context groups and has zero or
more group tag as children.
<group> This tag represents a single context group of the repository. It has two
attributes: name and lastModified. name is the unique identifier for this group.
lastModified contains the timestamp of the last modification date of this group.
This tag has zero or more instances of the member tag as its children. This
tag can also have zero or more group tags as its children. This allows for the
creation of subgroups.
<member> This tag represents a member of a context group. It has a single attribute: realID. The value of realID corresponds to the unique identifier for this
credential and the realID value of its credential tag.
<moreMetaData> This tag is a pointer to an additional meta-data file. Absence
of this tag means that there is not an additional meta-data file. This tag has
two attributes: name and key. name is the file name for the additional metadata. key is the encryption key for this additional file. The multiple meta-data
files can be chained together with this tag.
<credential> This tag represents a single credential in the repository. It is modified
in this format to have two new attributes, in addition to the two that have been
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previously defined. These additional attributes are: fakeID and key. fakeID is
the obfuscated identifier for this credential. key is the encryption key for this
credential.
As discussed in Section 5.3.4, it may be necessary to split a single meta-data file
into multiple pieces due to constraints imposed by the repository. Another motivation
for splitting the file is that a single large meta-data file could be easily identified when
surrounded by nothing but smaller credential files. Splitting a large meta-data file
into smaller pieces and padding as necessary is very helpful in disguising the file from
an attacker.
Figure 6.1 is a sample meta-data file in the extended format.
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<RepositoryMetaData>
<groups>
<group name=“LMC Creds” lastModified=“2004-05-25T108:01:50-0700”>
<member realID=“LMC Employee” />
<member realID=“LMC R&D VPN” />
</group>
...
</groups>
<credentials>
<credential realID=“LMC Employee” lastModified=“2004-05-24T19:33:06-0700”
fakeID=“2nmgbKhd5Y...” key=“aFVTMOaDDf...”>
<credentialInfo name=“Issuer” value=“Lucky Moose Consulting”/>
<credentialInfo name=“Subject” value=“Doc Hopper”/>
...
</credential>
<credential realID=“ACM” lastModified=“2004-12-31T13:31:02-0700”
fakeID=“hDCRDO2B05h...” key=“PDWodMkKKg...”>
<credentialInfo name=“Issuer” value=“ACM Membership Deptartment”/>
...
</credential>
</credentials>
<moreMetaData name=“hDCRDO2+B05...” key=“bPDWodMkKW...”/ >
</RepositoryMetaData>
Figure 6.1: A sample meta-data file created by Thor’s Central Management Utility.
This is the extended format for this file (see Section 5.3.4 for the version).
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This chapter presents the proof-of-concept implementation of Thor. The following
sections describe the design decisions made for the repository nodes, the target platforms, and the function of the Central Management Utility. The behavior of this
prototype provides evidence that Thor does indeed satisfy its design and implementation goals.
7.1

Root Repository Node
This prototype implementation of Thor uses the SACRED Credential Server [9,

16, 13] as its root repository node. This repository was chosen because it has a
simple, easy to use interface and is designed for application and device independence.
SACRED also has the ability to use a variety of communication and authentication
protocols.
The implementation of the SACRED Credential Server selected [5] is the first
publicly available implementation. This version is written in Java and was developed through a collaborative effort between the Internet Security Research Lab1 at
Brigham Young University and the National Center for Supercomputing Applications2 at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. This implementation of
the SACRED Credential Server uses BEEP [20] as its communication mechanism.
The SACRED profile in BEEP is tuned with TLS and uses SASL/DIGEST-MD5 as
an authentication mechanism.
7.2

Leaf Repository Node
The Java KeyStore serves as the leaf repository node in this implementation. The

KeyStore repository was designed to have a simple, easy to use API and meets the
1
2

Participants: Kent Seamons, Tim van der Horst
Participants: Jim Basney, Zheng Sun, Dong Xin
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interface requirements specified in Section 5.2. It can also be accessed by a myriad
of different applications. Specifically we used the JCEKS from the SunJCE provider,
which is included in the Java 2 SDK v1.4.2. The Java KeyStore also has the added
bonus of being able to use a different physical storage type (e.g., use a PKCS#12
repository) while maintaining the exact same interface. Due to this feature a user can
choose a variety of providers and physical store types while maintaining an identical
interface.
The Java KeyStore is also available for the Java 2 Micro Edition (J2ME). J2ME
is specifically designed for use with mobile phones, PDAs, and embedded systems.
Future extensions will make use of the J2ME.

7.3

Target Platforms
A minimum of two devices are needed for this prototype. The first device, a

standard desktop machine, houses the SACRED Credential Server. This machine is
a Pentium IV 3.0 GHz with 1 GB of RAM running Windows XP. Once the SACRED
server is configured for standard use, neither the repository nor the machine requires
any modifications to be integrated as the root repository node of Thor.
The second device needed for this prototype is a mobile device. There are many
different types of mobile devices and, as explained in Section 2.3, they have a wide
range of computational abilities. Due to these constraints it is unlikely that a single
implementation of Thor will function properly on every one of these devices. For the
purposes of this research the Thor prototype will be designed to run on a laptop-class
device. Although this is on the high end of the computational spectrum of mobile
devices, it is adequate to prove that the design and implementations goals of Thor
are met. Future extensions will adapt the implementation so that it will work within
the constraints of the target device.
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Figure 7.1: The Central Management Utility provides a location to manage and view
the credentials in the repositories controlled by Thor.
7.4

Application Interface
In this version of the Thor prototype, applications do not directly interface with

Thor. Instead, applications interface directly with their traditional repositories, as
they did before they were integrated with Thor. Thor manages the contents of these
repositories as it would any other leaf node. The creation of an interface to directly
access the credentials that reside in Thor is discussed in Chapter 8 as future work.
7.5

Central Management Utility
Thor’s Central Management Utility provides a graphical user interface to manage

the contents of the repositories controlled by Thor. To access the utility, a user must
first authenticate to the utility via a username and password. Once the user has
authenticated the meta-data is retrieved from the repositories and displayed.
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Thor’s Central Management Utility contains three displays (see Figure 7.1). The
Repository Status section displays the repository nodes with whom the utility is currently configured to make connections. This section also displays the specific repository type and its connection status. The utility in Figure 7.1 is connected to both a
leaf node and the root node.
The second portion of the utility is the Repository Contents. This part of the utility displays the credentials that reside in the connected repositories. Each credential
is listed by its unique credential identifier. To the left of each identifier there is either
one or two cylinders. A cylinder with an “R” indicates that the credential resides in
the root repository node. A cylinder with an “L” indicates that the credential resides
in the leaf credential node. The presence of both cylinders means that the credential
is in both the root and leaf nodes.
The management utility integrates the credential grouping capabilities described
in Section 6.1. The currently active groups are also displayed in the Repository
Contents section of the utility. In Figure 7.1, there are three groups: “Personal
Group”, “School Group”, and “Business Group”. Note how the “School Group” is
a sub-group of the “Personal Group”. The “Temporary GRID Credential” does not
belong to a group. Groups are created and managed via the Group Management
Utility (see Figure 7.2).
The third section of the utility displays additional information about the currently
selected credential. The information displayed is taken from the credentialInfo tags
of that credential in the meta-data. This section also provides the ability to modify
or add information about a credential.
Thor’s Central Management Utility also implements the password management
and identifier obfuscation described in Chapter 6. These features are completely
transparent to the user. An additional feature that can be enabled is the management
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Figure 7.2: This interface allows the user to create and manage groups of credentials.
A single credential can be a member of multiple groups. The list on the left contains
all the user’s credentials. When a group is selected, its credentials appear in the list
on the right. Credentials can be added or removed from a group using the “Add”
and “Remove” buttons between the lists.
keyMaterial = CryptographicHash(password|| <repositoryName>)
Figure 7.3: This is a simple password derivation scheme. The repository name is
appended to the plaintext password used to authenticate to Thor. This new string is
put through a cryptographic hash function, such as SHA-1, which creates a 20-byte
result. This result is then used as the derived password.

of repository authentication passwords. The current prototype of the management
tool uses a simple password derivation technique to create new passwords for the
repositories. These new passwords are derived from the authentication password to
Thor and never need to be stored as they can easily be generated when needed. Figure
7.3 illustrates the password derivation technique. Password recovery is a separate
application and is described in the next section.
7.6

Password Recovery Utility
In the event that the password to the Central Management Utility is lost, a user

can run Thor’s Password Recovery Utility. This will allow the user to recover his
forgotten password. The user will have to reset the password to the root repository
node using existing procedures. As mentioned in Section 6.2 this is a simple question/answer recovery scheme. This utility produces a decryption key and a credential
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Goals
G1

All five requirements for a secure credential repository in a mobile
environment must be satisfied.

G2

There must be no modifications required to the existing repository implementations.

G3

Where possible, increase usability and security of existing repos-

"
"
"

itories without modifying them.
Table 7.1: Summary of how well Thor meets its design and implementation goals
specified in Section 5.1. A indicates fulfillment. A
indicates an insufficiency

!

#

identifier using the answer to the question. The credential associated with this identifier is retrieved from the root repository node. This “credential” is actually the backup
password file. The backup password file is created during the initial setup of Thor.
This file is also padded to be the size of a credential. Once the password is recovered
the meta-data contained in the repository is unlocked and all of the user’s credentials
are one again accessible. After the password is recovered it is recommended that the
user choose a new password.
7.7

Does Thor Meet its Design and Implementation Goals?
There are three design and implementation goals for Thor (see Section 5.1). Sec-

tion 5.4 shows that Thor meets Goal G1. Section 5.3.3 shows the fulfillment of Goal
G2. Chapter 6 and Section 7.5 show that Thor satisfies Goal G3. When all is said
and done, Thor meets all of its design and implementation goals. Table 7.1 provides
a summary of how Thor measures up to its design and implementation goals.
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Chapter 8 — Future Work

Thor creates many possibilities for further improvements to repository management
and security. Many of these improvements have already been discussed in previous
chapters as future extensions. There still remains several of other repositories that
have not yet been incorporated into our system. Integration of these repositories and
their benefits is a definite priority. One of the most important features that has yet
to be integrated with Thor is smart cards.
Smart cards provide a unique solution to the problem of protecting sensitive information while it is not in use by a protocol. This protection is both at the physical
protection level as well as the electronic level. A smart card is tamper-resistant and
can perform calculations on the data without removing it off the card. This ability
comes with its costs. Smart cards are limited in the amount of information that can
be stored on them. Usually this is a limit of 32K for both an application and the
data to be stored. They are also limited in their computational power. There is an
overhead required to access and use the card. This overhead needs to be taken into
account if smart cards are going to be considered for integration into a secure system
and if time constraints and processing power are issues. Smart cards have a limitation
on the devices that they can operate with. In order for a device to use a smart card
it must be equipped with a smart card reader. These readers can be either wired
or wireless, but nonetheless they will require resources from the device in order to
perform their tasks. Perhaps the greatest advantage of the adoption of smart cards
is the ability to require two things of a user: Something a user has or possesses, the
card, and something that a user knows, his password or PIN required to access the
card. This is something that is very desirable when a system is protecting sensitive
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credentials that, if revealed, could have highly negative repercussions for the person
whose information was hijacked or abducted.
Another interesting topic with respect to smart cards is their integration into a
system. The method of smart card integration remains an open question. Will the
system charged with the authentication be aware of a smart card or not? If the
system is aware of a smart card then the system must be designed so that it can
recognize when the authentication information is not originating from the card. If
the system is designed such that it is not aware of a smart card’s involvement the
system can be viewed as oblivious to this fact. A user therefore could have the means
to have a smart card authenticate on his behalf or log in normally. The server never
knows the difference. Indeed this raises the question as to whether the system should
ever know by what means a user authenticated to the system. This is beneficial to a
user because it means that there are multiple methods to authenticate to the same
system based on the capabilities, or future capabilities of the user. The server, on
the other hand, may be very interested in learning how a user authenticated because
it allows the server more options to use in a more fine-grained access control model.
For example, a password authentication is sufficient to download a credential, but to
modify it requires smart card authentication.
Smart cards also provide a solution to a problem called keyjacking [18]. This
problem refers to the fact that the contents of any process are actually under the
control of any other process running with the user’s identity. By keeping the credentials off the device and away from any malicious processes, the integration of
smart cards into Thor greatly reduces this risk. A similar solution was applied to the
MyProxy credential repository through the addition of an IBM 4758 cryptographic
co-processor[17].
Currently, Thor is limited to credential retrieval and storage. The actual use
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of the credentials is in the applications. The integration of a virtual smart card
(the emulation of a smart card in software similar to RSA’s Keon Web PassPort) so
that other applications could access and use Thor like a physical smart card is very
desirable. This also ensures that a user’s private keys never leave the protection of the
repository. This is particularly compelling when a user is accessing his information
on a device that he does not own. The virtual smart card is pinned in memory and
ensures that no residual credential information is left on that device. Though the
virtual smart card is non-persistent, its contents can be stored in the local repository
when communication to the remote repository is not available or desired. Building
on this methodology, several virtual cards can be created based on the context groups
described in Section 6.1, thus limiting the applications that have access to specific
credentials. The use of the smart card interface also allows applications to access
credentials through an existing standard, rather than forcing the adoption of a new
interface.
Further refinement of the repository interface (see Section 5.2) is also in order.
This fine-tuning will lead to the proposal of an API standard which will allow for the
further interoperation of existing secure repositories. This interoperability increases
the security of sensitive digital credentials, and most importantly, gives the user the
power to select the combinations of systems that best meet his personal needs.
Many remote repositories have the ability to share computational loads with the
mobile device. In order to take advantage of this feature the interface specified by
Thor needs to be expanded to incorporate this functionality.
Another area for further investigation and research is to incorporate better methods of password recovery. This system could benefit from existing password recovery
schemes that do not rely on a third party. It is important to not rely on a third
party because a user should not have to give a third party access to his sensitive
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information.
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Chapter 9 — Conclusions

A mobile environment contains many hazards to managing the sensitive information
contained in digital credentials. This research examines these hazards and establishes a set of requirements for secure repositories in a mobile environment. These
requirements take into account the physical harshness, the connectivity, and usability
issues of this environment. It also shows that existing repositories, in context of these
requirements, are inadequate.
A new type of repository, the hybrid repository, is defined. The hybrid repository
combines the features of local and remote repositories to address the requirements of
a mobile environment.
Thor, a prototype design and implementation of a hybrid repository, is presented
and examined. Thor’s repository interface allows a user to combine existing local
and remote repositories into a single virtual repository. This hybrid repository, in
addition to satisfying the requirements of a mobile environment, adds several usability
and security features to existing repositories. These additional benefits are achieved
without any modification to the repositories. This is accomplished by the storing
of meta-data (which contains additional information about the credentials) in the
repository.
Thor enables the creation of credential groups to assist the user in keeping his
credentials organized. Thor also provides several features that are transparent to the
user. Each item is stored in the repository with a high-entropy encryption key and
with an obfuscated credential identifier. A reference implementation is presented to
illustrate these improvements.
Thor empowers users by automating several features that enhance the protection
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of their sensitive digital credentials and by giving them the flexibility to choose how
and where their information is stored while in a mobile environment.
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